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Abstract—Existing penetration testing approaches assess the
vulnerability of a system by determining whether certain
attack paths are possible in practice. Thus, penetration testing
has so far been used as a qualitative research method. To
enable quantitative approaches to security risk management,
including decision support based on the cost-effectiveness
of countermeasures, one needs quantitative measures of the
feasibility of an attack. Also, when physical or social attack
steps are involved, the binary view on whether a vulnerability
is present or not is insufficient, and one needs some viability
metric. When penetration tests are performed anyway, it is
very easy for the testers to keep track of, for example, the
time they spend on each attack step. Therefore, this paper
proposes the concept of quantitative penetration testing to
determine the difficulty rather than the possibility of attacks
based on such measurements. We do this by step-wise updates
of expected time and probability of success for all steps in an
attack scenario. In addition, we show how the skill of the testers
can be included to improve the accuracy of the metrics, based
on the framework of Item Response Theory (Elo ratings). We
prove the feasibility of the approach by means of simulations,
and discuss application possibilities.
Keywords-item response theory, penetration testing, quanti-
tative security, security metrics, socio-technical security
I. INTRODUCTION
Penetration testing is a method in which testers system-
atically try to reach a certain target asset in an organisation
by discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities, in order to
determine whether real attacks would be possible. Such
vulnerabilities may exist in the IT architecture, but also in
physical access controls or lack of awareness of employ-
ees, enabling social engineering attacks. The results of a
penetration test enable an organisation to address identified
attack opportunities by implementing countermeasures. This
approach is particularly effective when automated tools can
be employed to find standard vulnerabilities in remotely
accessible machines.
However, the “patch everything” approach to information
or cyber security has been controversial for a long time,
especially when multi-step, targeted attacks are concerned.
In such attacks, remote access may be combined with phys-
ical and even social attack steps, and a determined attacker
often has a reasonable chance of getting in. Economic
concerns demand that countermeasures are cost-effective,
and with a limited budget, risks need to be prioritised [1].
Statements like “there is a problem” are not sufficient to
provide decision support for countermeasure investment. In
order to support decisions, quantitative metrics for security
and security risks are needed [2]. Such measures are not
always easy to obtain, as data on attacks is often not shared.
Penetration testing, however, may consitute the ideal setting
to provide the necessary data.
Existing penetration testing approaches assess the vulner-
ability of a system by determining whether certain attack
paths are possible in practice. Therefore, penetration testing
has thus far been used as a qualitative research method.
But when complex, multi-domain penetration tests involving
human testers are performed anyway, it is very easy for the
testers to keep track of, for example, the time they spend
on each attack step. Such measurements could be used as
a basis for quantitative judgements on security. Therefore,
this paper proposes the concept of quantitative penetration
testing, and a method to determine the difficulty rather than
the possibility of attacks from penetration testing results.
More concretely, we derive estimates for both the ex-
pected time and the probability of success of attack steps
from penetration testing results. This can be done either
statically, calculating estimates from a data set, or iteratively,
updating the expected values after each attack observation.
In the latter case, it is also possible to take tester skill into
account, by updating both the difficulty of attack steps as
well as attacker skill ratings. The skill ratings of the testers
can then be used to calculate more accurate difficulty levels
for the steps. We provide simulations for expected time and
success probability estimates, and show that they converge
reasonably well, making the approach feasible in practical
applications.
In section II, we discuss the state-of-the-art and related
approaches. In section III, we define the requirements for
quantitative penetration testing. We formalise our basic
method for quantitative penetration testing in section IV,
and use Item Response Theory to include attacker skill in
section V. The results of simulations are shown in section
VI. We end with application opportunities in section VII and
conclusions in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Penetration testing
Penetration testing started as a hackers’ art, involving long
sessions to attempt to break into an organisation via the
Internet. Many attempts have been made to move towards
more scientific methods (see e.g. [3]), and several automated
tools for online testing are now available.
Next to online methods, penetration testing may also
include physical access to the facilities of an organisation[4].
In addition, social engineering can be included to determine
the human weaknesses that may provide access to assets [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9]. Overviews of penetration testing methods
are provided in [10], [11], [12].
Penetration testing may focus on single vulnerabilities, or
may involve multi-step attacks that would lead to the assets
[13]. With multi-step attacks, attack trees [14], [15] or attack
nets [3] may be used as a basis for the tests. Attack trees can
be annotated with the expected time needed for the attack
steps, so if attack trees are used, they can be annotated with
the time taken in the tests as a basis for further calculations
on the trees.
B. Item Response Theory
Item response theory is typically used to calibrate tests,
such as intelligence tests, when the skill levels of the persons
taking part in the calibration is not known. From a set of
correct and incorrect responses of a set of persons to a set of
items, both the skill of the persons and the difficulty of the
items can be estimated. The simplest case are 1-parameter
or Rasch models [16]. In the Math Garden project, this idea
was combined with dynamic updates of the ratings, rather
than a separate calibration phase [17]. This system is similar
to the one used to rank players in chess [18].
In [19], it was proposed to apply the framework of Item
Response Theory to security metrics. The key idea is that
the likelihood of success can be estimated from attack
strength and defense strength (difficulty). In this paper, rather
than considering single-event attacks, we focus on multi-
step attacks, in which digital, physical, and social attack
vectors can be combined. Also, the proposal in [19] did not
include time as a separate variable, and this is an important
contribution of the present paper. We separate probability
of success (related to attacker skill and step difficulty)
and time or effort spent (related to attacker speed and the
labour intensiveness of the step) into different variables.
Different possibilities for including response time (RT) in
Item Response Theory models are discussed in [20].
III. REQUIREMENTS
A. Parameters
In order to enable quantitative penetration testing, the first
thing to do is to choose the quantitative variables to be
taken into account. We consider the time that an attacker
requires to perform an attack, and the probability that the
attack is successful. Depending on the problem context, time
can be replaced by other parameters, such as resources to
answer the question ‘How many resources does an attacker
have to invest?’. We can also replace time by knowledge to
determine ‘How much does the attacker have to know about
the attacked system?’.
In the following section, we will focus on the parameter
time for the simplicity of its measurement. We consider
multi-step attacks and, thus, we assume that complex attacks
are synthesized by elementary steps which are sequentially
executed one after another. This assumption is widely used
in attack modelling formalisms like attack trees or attack
nets [14], [15], [3].
B. Distributions
We consider a random variable X that describes the time
of an successful attack execution. We are interested in the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) that the system is
still not compromised at time t, that is the function f(t) =
P[X ≤ t] of X . Since any CDF always approaches 1 for
increasing t, this implies that an attacker always succeeds if
he is given sufficient time.
However, for most attacks there is a chance that the
attacker is caught or aborts the attack attempt after a certain
time. We consider this possibility of failure by deriving (1)
the probability that the attack step is executed successfully,
independent of time t, and (2) the CDF which describes the
execution time of an attack step, on the condition that the
attack step is successfully executed.
For (2) we need to make an assumption for the underlying
family of distributions and then estimate the correspond-
ing parameters. Many time-dependent modelling formalisms
make use of the exponential distribution to express the evo-
lution of the attacker’s success as time progresses. Empirical
underpinning for this modelling choice is given in [21]
where experiments on the intrusion into computer systems
yielded the result, that the intrusion process consists of
different phases with an exponentially distributed execution
time. Let X be an exponentially distributed random variable,
then it is defined by its cumulative distribution function
(CDF)
P(X ≤ t) = 1− e−λt, for any t ∈ R+.
Especially in the context of complex analysis the exponential
distribution has its merits: Its shape is completely defined
by only one parameter, it is tractable and can easily be
embedded in complex calculations. Its expected value is
given by
E[X] =
1
λ
.
One can argue that the simplicity of the exponential
distribution does not accurately reflect the nature of human
behaviour as it is usually characterized by fluctuations. RT
models try to repair this flaw by using Weibull distributions
or log normal distribution [20]. However, the possibly higher
precision of these distributions comes at the expense of more
input parameters. In other words, the exploitation of the full
potential of these families of distribution requires sufficient
data to estimate the parameters. As in the security context
data is a good in short supply, this is the main reason to
resort to the exponential distribution.
C. Attack steps and attacks
Formally, an attack step is a step name associated with
an execution time parameter and a success probability. The
attacker needs to invest an exponentially distributed amount
of time to successfully execute the attack step, while the
success probability describes the chance to successfully
complete it.
Definition 1: An attack step a is an elementary, non-
refinable step in the course of an attack. Its execution
time is exponentially distributed with parameter λa ∈ R+.
The probability that the attacker attacker succeeds in the
execution of the step is denoted by pa ∈ [0..1].
Note that if one has information about the correlation be-
tween pa and λa, then one could use this in the model [20],
but for simplicity, we will not pursue that direction here.
The parameter λa intrinsically reflects the labour intensity
of attack step a. As the expected execution time of an
attack step is 1λa , lower values for λa reflect a higher labour
intensity for a.
To achieve his goal, the attacker has to execute a number
of attack steps. We call this sequence of attacks steps an
attack scenario.
Definition 2: An attack scenario A is a sequence of
attack steps A = a1, . . . , an. We denote with n = |A| the
number of attack steps. The attack step a = A[i] at position
i is in the following abbreviated with i, as A is always clear
from the context.
An attack scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. The sce-
nario consists of n attacks steps which are carried out one
after another. The execution of each attack step i takes
an exponentially distributed time with parameter λi. The
attacker either fails with probability 1 − pi or succeeds
with probability pi, and if he fails in one attack step, the
whole attack is aborted, indicated by the black absorbing
states. If the attacker succeeds in the execution of i, he
immediately starts with the execution of attack step i + 1.
The attack is successful, if all n attack steps have been
successfully compromised. We define an attacker’s actual
attempt as an attack execution. An attack execution consists
of the attacker’s plan in the form of an attack scenario and
information about the duration and success for each involved
attack step. If the attacker fails at a certain step, the attack
is aborted and there is thus no information on subsequent
steps.
....
Attack step 1 Attack step 2 Attack step n
λ1p1 λ2p2 λn−1 λnpn
1− p1 1− p2 1− pn
Figure 1. An attack scenario with n attack steps, each defined by parameter
λi and success probability pi, i = 1, . . . , n. States in which the attack fails
are colored in black. The state in which the attacker has reached his goal
is colored in gray.
Definition 3: An attack execution
E = (A, t1, . . . , tm1 , r1, . . . , rm2) of attack scenario A
consists of execution times t1, . . . , tm1 ∈ R≥0 and results
t1, . . . , tm2 ∈ {0, 1} for the involved attack steps, where
ti is the time needed to carry out step i; ri = 0 indicates
the failure and ri = 1 the success of attack step i. The first
attack step at which the attacker fails is denoted by fE ; if all
attack steps are executed successfully, we define fE = n+1.
We only consider execution times for successfully executed
steps, so m1 = fE − 1, and results for all steps that the
attacker worked on, so m2 = min{fE , n}.
An attack execution fails, if at least one attack step fails, so
the result of E is defined by rE = min{ri|i = 1, . . . ,m2}.
Similarly, the total execution time of E is denoted by tE =∑fE−1
j=1 ti.
In practice, data about actual attacks is rare and mostly
incomplete. Exact execution times of individual attack steps
may not be retrievable, it might not be possible to determine
the exact point where an attack failed, but the total execution
time and the result of the whole attack execution is known.
Definition 4: An attack observation
O = (A, tE , rE , T,R) of an attack execution E of attack
scenario A consists of the total execution time tE , the result
of the attack execution rE , and functions T : step →
{tstep,⊥} and R : step → {rstep,⊥} that define which
execution times, respectively results, were observed. For
R(a) = ⊥ the result of attack step a is not known, T (a) = ⊥
analoguely. If T (i) = ti and R(i) = ri for all i = 1, . . . , n,
i.e. all results and times are observed, we say that the
observation is complete.
Note that the failed step fE might not be known, in which
case we set m1 = m2 = n. We assume that the attack
scenario A as well as rE and tE are known. This assumption
should not imply that these information are always retriev-
able, as this is in general not the case, but rather suggest
that they are of vital importance with respect to the analysis
techniques described below.
Table I illustrates four example observations of attack
executions. Some steps occur in more than one scenario,
but not necessarily at the same index. In physical penetration
testing, entering a building would typically occur often. O1
is a complete observation of a successful attack; O2 is a
complete observation of an attack execution that failed at
Table I
FOUR OBSERVATIONS O1, O2, O3 AND O4 OF ATTACK EXECUTIONS.
THE OBSERVATION OF ONE ATTACK STEP i IS DENOTED AS TUPLE
(ai, ri, ti).
rE tE 1st step 2nd step 3rd step 4th step 5th step
O1 1 54 (a3, 1, 9) (a2, 1, 14) (a7, 1, 2) (a1, 1, 20) (a2, 1, 9)
O2 0 17 (a7, 1, 3) (a2, 1, 1) (a1, 0, 13)
O3 1 94 (a1, 1, 43) (a4, 1,⊥) (a3, 1,⊥) (a2, 1,⊥)
O4 0 42 (a1, 1, 35) (a2, 1,⊥) (a4,⊥,⊥) (a6,⊥,⊥) (a5,⊥,⊥)
step a1; O3 is an incomplete observation of a successful
attack execution in which only the execution time of the first
attack step is known; O4 is an incomplete observation of an
unsuccessful attack execution in which neither all execution
times nor the failed attack step is known.
D. Problem statement
On the basis of these definitions, we aim at solving the
following problem:
Under the assumption that the execution time
of attack step a is exponentially distributed with
parameter λa and its success probability governed
by pa, find good estimates λa and pa on the basis
of a number of attack observations.
IV. BASIC PARAMETER ESTIMATION
A. Static estimation
The most intuitive approach to derive estimates λa and pa
for an attack step a is the computation of the mean average
over a series of observations. Given a set of attack obser-
vations Ω = {O1, O2 . . . } in which an attack step a occurs
multiple times, we can estimate the success probability of
a by calculating the mean average of our sample set. Let
r1, . . . , rk denote the observations of the results of attack
step a within Ω, then
pa =
1
k
k∑
j=1
rj . (1)
For example, the estimate for pa1 on the basis of Table I is
pa1 =
1+1+0+1
4 =
3
4 . The parameter λa, which determines
the shape of the CDF of the distribution of the execution
time, can be derived in a similar fashion. Given observed
execution times t1, . . . , tk of attack step a within Ω, we can
derive the mean average of the execution time
ta =
1
k
k∑
j=1
tj (2)
and use the fact that 1/λa is the expected value of the
exponential distribution to derive λa = 1/ta. For example,
λa1 is estimated from the data in Table I as λa1 =
4
20+13+43+35 = 0.009. The advantage of these estimates
is that they are consistent, i.e. on average we hit the true
value, and unbiased, i.e. for k → ∞ we hit the true value
with arbitrary precision. Moreover, the standard error of the
average mean, governed by σ√
k
with σ the standard deviation
of one single observation, vanishes with increasing k. With
these values, we can for instance derive confidence intervals
to argue about the reliability of the estimate.
However, this approach has the following shortcomings:
• The values ri, . . . , rn and ti, . . . , tn have to be known.
Unknown execution times and results in incomplete
observations have to be ignored in the estimate. As
we argued before, incomplete data is rather typical in
attack observations and we need to find mechanisms
which can deal with this;
• The number of observations k should be sufficiently
large to achieve a reasonable accurate estimate. How-
ever, there is usually not sufficient amount of data about
attacks available to yield good estimates. A possible so-
lution to this dilemma is that in most cases a reasonable
initial estimate for painit and λa
init
can be provided on
the basis of expert opinion and previous experiences,
and this initial estimate can then be updated when data
become available. These updates are not possible with
the static approach outlined above.
B. Dynamic estimation
To deal with the shortcomings above, we propose a
technique that updates the estimates λa and pa on a step-
by-step basis. Starting from initial values λa
init
and painit,
we iteratively update these value with one observation at a
time. The initial values λa
init
and painit can be chosen on
the basis of expert opinions and previous experiences. As
the quality of the observation varies from case to case, we
provide update techniques for different observation scenar-
ios.
Complete observation: all input data known: Complete
information about attacks can typically be derived from
penetration tests. Assume we have a complete observation
O = (A, tE , rE , T,R) of an attack execution E and we
want to estimate the parameters for some attack step i.
Furthermore, we have initial estimates λi
init
and piinit
based on previous observations. Since 1λi is the expected
execution time, we use the observation ti in O to obtain
observation based estimates λi
O
= 1ti . We then update our
initial estimates by performing a linear interpolation between
λi
init
and the observation based estimates λi
O
. If E was
successful, we do so for each involved attack step; if E
failed, only the steps i = 1, . . . , fE−1 that were successfully
executed are updated. Note that we do not consider the
execution times of attack steps that fail, because λi describes
the execution time for successful steps. Formally, we have
λi ← cλiλi
init
+ (1− cλi)λi
O
, i = 1, 2, . . . , fE − 1. (3)
The impact of the observation on the new estimate is
determined by cλi ∈[0,1]. This value reflects the confidence
in the previous estimate. The motivation for this parameter
is that a higher confidence in the initial estimate should
decrease the weight of observations on the update: cλi = 1
expresses 100% confidence in the initial estimate, so that it
is no longer updated. On the contrary, cλi = 0 expresses
absolute uncertainty. This parameter is discussed in more
detail in the following paragraph.
The parameter pi is updated analogously. From the obser-
vation we obtain the estimate piO = ri and derive the new
estimate pi as a linear interpolation between this value and
the previous estimate piinit on the basis of confidence value
cpi
pi ← cpipiinit + (1− cpi)ri , i = 1, 2, . . . , fE . (4)
The choice of confidence values: In principle, the
iterative approach does not guarantee a relation with the
mean values that would be obtained from a static estimation.
However, the confidence values can be chosen in such a way
that it is possible to obtain a mean average with the dynamic
estimation, and corresponding properties and guarantees for
the accuracy of the obtained estimate hold.
Assume we want to estimate pa from a set of observations
Ω = {O1, O2 . . . }. The dynamic estimation requires initial
estimates painit prior to the first update. Together with Ω
they constitute the input of the dynamic estimation. The
value cinitpa expresses the, rather subjective, confidence in this
initial estimate. Let r1, . . . , rk denote the observed results of
attack steps a in Ω and cjpa the confidence in pa after the
j-th update. The estimate pa1 after the first update step is
then
pa
1 = pa
initcinitpa + r1(1− cinitpa ).
Recursively, the estimate paj after each successive update
j = 2, . . . , k is
pa
j = pa
j−1cj−1pa + rj(1− cj−1pa ).
Assume we have no information on painit, so cinitpa =
0. We want to find values cjpa for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1
such that each result observation r1, . . . , rk impacts the final
estimate pak with the same weight and we thus obtain a
mean average. This is achieved by cjpa =
1
j , which yields
pa
k = (((r1
1
2
+r2
1
2
)
2
3
+r3
1
3
)
3
4
. . . )
k − 1
k
+rk
1
k
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
rj .
We now consider the more general case that we have some
knowledge about painit with cinitpa > 0. We further want to
obtain an update rule
cjpa ← cj−1pa + ρ, (5)
such that cjpa ∈ [0, 1], and each result observation r1, . . . , rk
impacts the final estimate pak with the same weight regard-
less of the initial confidence cinitpa , i.e.
pa
k = cinitpa pa
init + (1− cinitpa )
1
k
k∑
j=1
rj .
If we consider the last two update steps k and k − 1, then
the weight of rk in pak is (1− ck−1pa ); while the weight of
rk−1 is determined by (1 − ck−2pa ) · ck−1pa as the product of
the weights of rk−1 and pak−1. As this holds for all pairs
j, j − 1 with j < k we obtain
(1− cjpa) = (1− cj−1pa ) · cjpa .
We use (5) and set cjpa = c
j−1
pa + ρ. Solving the resulting
equation with respect to ρ yields
ρ =
1
( 1
1−cj−1pa
)( 1
1−cj−1pa
+ 1)
. (6)
By applying the update rule in (5) in the step-wise updates
we now make sure that each prior observation has the
same impact on the current estimate pak, independent of
k. Obviously, the same holds for the estimate λa
k
.
Incomplete observation: unknown step times: Assume
we have an incomplete observation
O = (A, tE , rE , T,R) where not all execution times are
observed, i.e. T (i) = ⊥ for at least one attack step i.
In the worst case we might even have T (i) = ⊥ for
all i = 1, . . . , n. In practice one faces this problem if
information about the total execution time can be obtained
but not broken down to the different attack steps. In the
calculation of the mean average we have to ignore all
missing execution times. However, in the dynamic case we
can use the current estimate 1/λi for the execution time to
retrieve the missing execution times.
We first consider the worst case scenario T (i) = ⊥ for
all i = 1, . . . , n, with tE and fE known. We assume that
the proportion of the execution time of each attack step
corresponds to the proportion on the basis of the previous
estimates. In other words, we estimate
ti = tE · 1/λi∑fE−1
j=1 1/λj
∀i = 1, . . . , fE − 1.
We can perform a similar estimation, if any subset of the
execution times of all steps is observed: Let t∗E be the sum
of all known execution times in the observation and J the
set that contains the indexes of all attack steps for which the
execution time is unknown, then
ti = (tE − t∗E) ·
1/λi∑
j∈J 1/λj
∀i ∈ J. (7)
With these estimates one can then perform the updates
according to (3).
Incomplete observation: unknown failed step: Assume
we have an incomplete observation
O = (A, tE , rE , T,R) where not all results are observed,
i.e. R(i) = ⊥ for at least one i. Since we assume that we
always know the outcome rE of the whole attack execution,
this is only a problem if the attack failed, i.e. rE = 0, but
we do not know at which step fE . This kind of observation
occurs in practice, when the attacker’s goal and attack plan
can be reconstructed from the reported information, but the
reason for his failure remains unknown.
Assume that the last observed successful attack step in O
is s and we know that the attack failed at some point after
that, so that ri = 0 for some i = s + 1, . . . , n. Note that
s = 0 if no attack step result is known. For steps i = 1, . . . , s
we can update with (4). For steps i = s + 1, . . . , n we can
use our previous estimate pi to estimate the probability pFi
that the attack failed at this step. For the attack execution to
fail at step i, the previous steps s+ 1, . . . , i− 1 have to be
executed successfully:
pFi
∗
= (1− pi)
i−1∏
j=s+1
pj , i = s+ 1, . . . , n.
Since pFi represents the probability that the attacker fails
at this step, we need
∑n
j=s+1 p
F
j = 1 to hold. Thus, we
normalize
pFi = p
F
i
∗ 1∑n
j=s+1 p
F
j
∗ , i = s+ 1, . . . , n. (8)
We can then update pi by weighting the failure probability
pFi against the success probability p
S
i =
∑n
j=i+1 p
F
j . Note
that pSi + p
F
i < 0 if the probability that the attack failed
before i is greater than zero. We address this uncertainty by
decreasing the weight of the update by 1− (pSi + pFi ):
pi ← (1−(1−cpi)(pSi +pFi ))pi+(1−cpi)(pSi ·1+pFi ·0) (9)
Table II summarizes the above ideas by giving an
overview on how to perform updates with either complete
and incomplete observations. We remark that, in case one
wants to perform a number of updates with complete and in-
complete observations at the same time, one should perform
updates on the complete observations first.
V. INCLUDING ATTACKER SKILL
A. Attacker model
In the previous section, we assumed that one typically
does not know the identity of the attacker. In this case,
one basically assumes that the attacks launched against the
system come from a single “attacker”, who is representative
for the total population of attackers.
In this section, we propose a model for situations in
which the identity of the attacker is known. This is typically
the case in a penetration testing setting, and therefore the
Table II
UPDATE PROCEDURES FOR λi AND pi ON THE BASIS OF COMPLETE AND
INCOMPLETE OBSERVATIONS.
Scenario Input Mechanism
Update of λi with A, ti, fE > i, update with (3)
complete observation λi, cλi
Update of λi with A, tE , fE > i, find ti with (7)
incomplete observation λi, cλi update with (3)
Update of pi with A, ri, update with (4)
complete observation pi, cpi
Update of pi with A, rE = 0, find pFi with (8)
incomplete observation pi, cpi update with (4),(9)
approach presented here is the main one to be used in
quantitative penetration testing. As both attacker skill and
step difficulty are assessed, this model is very similar to
what is called Item Response Theory in social science.
B. Item Response Theory
Item Response Theory is a means to gather data on skill
and difficulty levels without having a priori information.
Typically, it can be used to calibrate tests that measure a
certain ability. A group of persons is asked to solve test
items, and based on the results, both the ability of the
persons and the difficulty of the items is estimated. This
static calibration approach is reflected in Rasch models [16],
as well as multi-parameter variants.
Next to the static setting, Item Response Theory can also
be applied iteratively, by updating ratings after each event. A
famous application of such dynamic models occurs in chess,
where so-called Elo ratings are used to rank players [18].
Players start with a default value, and gain or lose points
based on the result of the matches they play. In particular,
the difference between the actual result and the expected
result determines how the ratings are updated. There is only
one type of entity here (players), with associated skill levels.
In the Math Garden project [17], dynamic ratings are
applied to both persons (skill) and test items (difficulty),
in order to offer children math problems tailored to their
skill level. Again, both ratings are updated based on the
difference between actual and expected result.
The similarity of the latter approach to security, where
attackers play “matches” against systems, was noted in [19].
The paper focused on a general risk management setting, and
mentioned that for malicious settings, data could be hard to
obtain. The authors suggested the application to penetration
testing, for reasons of data availability, but did not discuss
the details.
For the dynamic setting, initial (default) ratings are nec-
essary to bootstrap the system. In chess, for example, all
players start with the same default rating. When additional
information is available, one could decide to adjust the initial
ratings to previous knowledge about skill and difficulty. In
the security field, initial values for dynamic ratings may be
set based on expert judgement, or results of earlier scientific
experiments, when such data are already available from
earlier risk assessments.
The standard assumption in Item Response Theory is that,
if the ratings of both “competing” actors are equal, then the
probability of success is 0.5. For example, the probability
of a person with skill 500 solving a problem with difficulty
500 is 0.5.
In the original Elo framework, there is only one value to
be updated. Here, we take both probability of success and
time into account. As we distinguish between the output
parameters execution time and success probability, we also
define two parameters for each person and attack step to
represent the individual impact on these two outputs. The
attacker’s influence upon the success probability is called
skill, and his speed impacts the execution time of an attack
step. From the perspective of the attack step, the success
probability is determined by its difficulty and the execution
time by its labour intensity. These parameters form the
basis of our analysis framework depicted in Figure 2. In the
following, these parameters will be expressed by Elo ratings.
The idea of parameter separation is also found in Item
Attack step
parameters
Attacker
parameters
Attacker
skill (β)
Attack step
difficulty (δ)
Attacker
speed (τ )
Attack
step labor
intensity (θ)
Outcome
/ Result
Execution
time
Figure 2. Illustration of the hierachical framwork for the modelling of
execution times and attack outcome.
Response Theory: “RT [response time] models with speed
as a person parameter should also have an item parameter
for their time intensity” [20].
In order to use the time parameter in combination with
ratings, we need a definition that allows us to relate the speed
and labour intensity ratings, just like the skill and difficulty
ratings are related by the assumption that equality of the
ratings gives 0.5 probability of success. Here, we assume
that in case the ratings are equal, the expected duration is 1
unit of time, or λ = 1. The dependencies of these parameters
with respect to the formation of values for outcome and
execution time are defined as follows.
Distribution of Execution time: For an observation of
an attack A with attacker j we denote with τj the speed of
the attacker and with θi the labour intensity of attack step i.
Figure 3. The CDF P(X ≤ t) for the execution time of attack step i in
dependence of attacker speed τj . The labour intesity is fixed as θi = 1
The relation between these two parameters is defined as in
RT models [20]: the execution time tij of attack step i for
attacker j can be derived by
tij =
θi
τj
. (10)
Speed is thus defined by decomposing the execution time
into two parameters, one for the speed of the attacker and
one for the labour intensity of the attack step. We now want
to obtain a distribution function for the execution time with
respect to these two parameters. Remember, that we assume
the execution time of attacker j for attack step i to be
exponentially distributed with parameter λij and expected
value 1λij . We can thus assume that
1
λij
= tij =
θi
τj
and
derive the CDF for the execution time X of attack step i by
attacker j
P(X ≤ t) = 1− e−
τj
θi
t
, for any t ∈ R+. (11)
This CDF in dependence of τj is visualized in Figure 3.
Probability for attack step outcome: Similarly to above,
we define βj as the skill level of attacker j and δi as the
difficulty of attack step i. The probability of the attacker
succeeding in the attack step depends jointly on his skill and
the difficulty of the attack step. We describe this probability
by a logistic model. The standard model is the Rasch model,
or one parameter logistic model (1PL model) [16], which
expresses the probability to successfully penetrate attack step
i as
P(ri = 1) =
eβj−δi
1 + eβj−δi
=
1
1 + eδi−βj
. (12)
C. Updates of Elo ratings
In this section we present algorithms to systematically
update the Elo ratings for θ, τ , δ and β on the basis of one
single observation. In a penetration testing setting, one can
ask the testers to monitor the time they spent on the different
attack steps precisely. Moreover, one knows the identity of
the attackers, and can therefore maintain Elo ratings for each
of them, based on past performance. In this case, for each
attack step i = 1, 2, . . . one can estimate, store, and update
the following information:
1) difficulty δi, expressed as Elo rating;
2) labour intensity θi of each step, expressed as Elo
rating;
3) confidence cθi of the labour intensity estimate.
Additionally, one can estimate information for each tester
j = 1, 2, . . . :
1) skill level βj , expressed as Elo rating;
2) speed level τj , expressed as Elo rating;
3) confidence cτj of the speed estimate.
Beyond the scope of penetration tests, accurate data might
not be available and we have to resort to the techniques
described in Section 4.2 to fill the gaps.
Update algorithm for θi and τj: Assume we have
observed an attack execution E containing attack steps
a1, . . . , an and have identified attacker j. Furthermore, we
have information on the timing of the attack in the form of
the total execution time tE and a subset T of the execution
times of each involved attack step. The execution times
are dependent on both τj and θi through equation (10),
so that we update both parameters simultaneously on the
basis of previous estimates. The update routine for θi is
Algorithm 1 Update of θ1, . . . , θm1
Require: O, θ1, . . . , θm1 , cθi , . . . , cθm1 τj
if fE known then
if O is incomplete then
tj ← ESTIMATEEXECUTIONTIMES(T, tE , θ1, . . . , θn)
end if
for i = 1, . . . , fE − 1 do
θOi ← τjtij
θi ← cθiθi + (1− cθi)θOi
UPDATECONFIDENCE(cθi)
end for
end if
presented in Algorithm 1. We update τj and cτi with a
given observation O, with tj being a vector containing all
execution times tij . If the attack execution failed, we assume
that we can only perform sensible updates if fE is known;
otherwise we are also missing execution times which we
cannot estimate with (7) since fE is unknown as well.
If the observation is incomplete and does not contain all
execution time, we estimate the missing execution times with
ESTIMATEEXECUTIONTIMES by applying (7), where tj is
the vector containing all execution times. For each attack
step up to fE − 1, we then derive an estimate θOi based on
the single observation O through equation (10). We finally
update θi with a linear interpolation between the previous
estimate and θOi as in (3). The impact of θ
O
i upon the update
is determined by the confidence cθi . Finally, the function
UPDATECONFIDENCE updates the confidence values with
(5) to make sure that each observation has the same impact
upon the final estimate.
The update of τi is executed similarly. For each attack step
we calculate the observation based estimate τOij and update
by linear interpolation. We assume that the attacker’s speed
level does not evolve in the course of one attack and update
τj only once on the basis of all execution times: with (10) we
derive for each step an observation based estimate τOij and
calculate the mean average τOj of these values. The impact
of τOij on the update is determined by confidence cτj .
Algorithm 2 Update of τj
Require: O, θ1, . . . , θm1 , τj , cτj
if fE known then
if O is incomplete then
tj ← ESTIMATEEXECUTIONTIMES(T, tE , θ1, . . . , θn)
end if
τOj ← 0
for i = 1, . . . , fE − 1 do
τOij ← θitij
τOj ← τOj + τOij
end for
τOj ← τ
O
j
fE−1
τj ← cτjτj + (1− cτj )τOj
UPDATECONFIDENCE(cτj )
end if
Update algorithms for δi and βj: Given an attack
observation O, we want to update the difficulty δi for each
involved attack step i and the skill level βj for attacker j. As
above, we execute both updates simultaneously. The update
routine for δi is presented in Algorithm 3. If O is incomplete
and does not include the information at which step an
unsuccessful attack execution failed, we first determine the
last observed attack step s with GETLASTKNOWNSTEPRE-
SULT. We then use the function ESTIMATEFAILPROB to
determine for each step i = s + 1, . . . ,m2 the failure
probability pFi and store it in the vector pF . The function
computes (8) by exploiting (12) to get pi = 11+eδi−βj . Note
that if fE is not known we have m2 = n. In contrast to
the updates above, we cannot derive an observation based
estimate, since ri ∈ {0, 1}. So, instead of performing a linear
interpolation, we update δi by calculating the difference
between the expected probability p, computed with (12), and
the observed result. We then add this value to the previous
estimate, as in classic Elo models. Since this already assures
that each update equally impacts the final estimate, we do not
need confidence values in this context. However, an initial
value δiniti is required prior to the first update. For steps
s+ 1, . . . ,m2 we update δi by using a slight adaptation of
(9).
Algorithm 3 Update of δ1, . . . , δm2
Require: O, δ1, . . . , δm2 , βj
s← m2
if O is incomplete then
s← GETLASTKNOWNSTEPRESULT(O)
pF ← ESTIMATEFAILPROBS(δs+1, . . . , δm2)
pS ← ESTIMATESUCPROBS(pF )
end if
for i = 1, . . . , s do
p = 1
1+eδi−βj
δi ← δi + (p− ri)
end for
for i = s+ 1, . . . ,m2 do
p = 1
1+eδi−βj
δi ← δi + pF (p− 0) + pS(p− 1)
end for
The update procedure for the attacker skill βj of attacker j
is executed analoguely to Algorithm 3. This time, we update
by subtracting the expected probability p from the result ri,
since a successful attack step execution should increase the
Elo value.
Algorithm 4 Update of βj
Require: O, δ1, . . . , δm2 , βj
if O is incomplete then
s← GETLASTKNOWNSTEPRESULT(O)
pF ← ESTIMATEFAILPROBS(δs+1, . . . , δm2)
pS ← ESTIMATESUCPROBS(pF )
end if
for i = 1, . . . , s do
p = 1
1+eδi−βj
βj ← βj + (ri − p)
end for
for i = s+ 1, . . . ,m2 do
p = 1
1+eδi−βj
βj ← βj + pF (0− p) + pS(1− p)
end for
VI. SIMULATION
We implemented the above algorithms in a simulation
program as a proof-of-concept. Each simulation run consists
of a test set containing a number k of attack observations.
Each attack is randomly synthesized from a pool of 10 attack
steps. Each attack step has a 50% chance to end up in an
attack observation; thus, on average one attack consists of 5
attack steps. Further, each attack step in this pool has a true
value θtruei for its labour intensity and a true value δ
true
i .
Simulation runs on θi: We want to investigate the
impact of the number k of observations and the impact of
the quality of observations on the accuracy of the resulting
estimate of the labour intensity θi. For this, we execute
simulation runs with varying k. In each simulation run, we
generate k observations, where observed execution times
t1, . . . , tfE−1 are generated randomly according to (11)
with θtruei and τj as inputs. The attacker strength bi is
randomly generated for each observation. Furthermore, the
probability that an observation is incomplete is determined
by pI ∈ [0, 1]. All incomplete observations have T (i) = ⊥
for each involved attack step i, so only the total execution
time of the whole attack is known.
We set cinitθi = 0, so we assume there is no initial estimate,
and use all k observations to perform stepwise updates on
θi according to Algorithm 1. To measure the accuracy of the
result, we computed the sample variance, in percentage of
the true value, for N > 1000 simulation runs for different
pairs of parameters k,pI , i.e.
σ2N−1 =
1
(N − 1)θtruei
N∑
j=1
(θji − θtruei )2.
The results are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The sample variance σ2N−1 (in percentage) of simulation runs
on θki for different parameter pairs k and pI .
Simulation runs on δi: We conducted similar experi-
ments to determine the impact of the number k of observa-
tions and the impact of the quality of observations on the
accuracy of the estimate of the attack step difficulty δki . We
choose a similar set-up as above: the results r1, . . . , rm2
of each observation are generated with (12), with δtruei
and βj as inputs. The probability that an observation is
incomplete is determined by pI . All incomplete observations
have R(i) = ⊥ for each attack step i, so we do not know the
outcome of any involved attack step, but only the outcome
of the whole attack. We further have cinitδi = 0. The results
are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. The sample variance σ2N−1 (in percentage) of simulation runs
on δki for different parameter pairs k and pI .
Conclusions from simulations: The stepwise update
algorithms iteratively improve the quality of the estimates
and yields quite accurate results after about 20 to 40 updates.
Performing updates on the complete observations first and
providing a good initial estimate can improve the results
further. The consideration of incomplete observations does
not seem to improve the accuracy of δi significantly, since
one obtains similar results when ignoring them. However,
for θi they visibly improve the accuracy. Thus, incomplete
observations should be considered in the estimation process.
VII. APPLICATION
The framework outlined above paves the way towards
obtaining quantitative results from penetration tests. The
practial applicability depends to a large extent on the goal
of the measurements. If one wants to obtain statistically
significant results, one would need to set up a large-scale
experiment with many penetration testers. Testers need to
try the same attacks in order to be able to update their
ratings. This can be done for research purposes, and it
has been shown for qualitative penetration testing using
social engineering [6]. Based on the ideas developed in
this paper, we are planning similar experiments to obtain
quantitative data. However, such experiments would most
likely be unrealistic in a corporate risk management setting.
Still, as our results show, one can obtain reasonable esti-
mates with only a few attempts and a few penetration testers.
A reasonable strategy for practical testing could be to let 2
or 3 penetration testers execute the same scenarios, monitor
the variance in the outcomes, and hire more pentesters only
if the variance is high.
Quantitative penetration testing has the advantage that
improvements in security can also be quantified. If the test
is repeated after improvements have been made, the newly
measured difficulty of attack can be compared against the
previous value. With Item Reponse Theory, this is possible
even if different penetration testers are involved, assuming
the ratings of the testers are sufficiently accurate.
Apart from yielding quantitative results, our proposal has
another advantage: ratings may motivate penetration testers
to perform well. Our hypothesis is that penetration testers
would be keen on obtaining high ratings, and therefore
would be incentivised to do a good job. To test this hypothe-
sis, one would need to run two parallel penetration tests, with
and without the rating incentive, and evaluate differences in
the time needed to succeed. Obviously, ratings could also
be an incentive to cheat in reporting results, for example by
reporting a shorter time than actually needed, in order to
increase one’s rating. If this turns out to be a real problem,
reporting would have to be done by an independent actor.
Finally, if there is not enough data to support difficulty
ratings for steps, one can also rate organisations instead of
attack steps. For each attack observation, the ratings of the
attacker/tester and the rating of the organisation would then
be updated. In this case, one would not obtain quantitative
results of steps, but one would still have the advantage of
being able to say how likely it would be that an attacker with
a low rating would succeed in attacking the organisation.
The main application of quantitative penetration testing
is foreseen in quantitative security risk management, re-
quiring quantitative security metrics. Based on the Risk
Taxonomy of The Open Group, which we use in our project,
quantitative penetration testing provides a metric for the
vulnerability of the organisation to attack steps and attacks.
However, in order to fully estimate risk, metrics for the
expected frequency of attacks and the impact of attacks
are needed as well. These are not trivial, and especially a
suitable model of the (real) attackers is required to estimate
their behaviour in response to the perceived gain, effort
(time), and probability of success. We address such questions
in other papers. Here, the claim is that our new proposal for
quantitative penetration testing provides an important step
towards fully quantitative security risk management, and in
particular decision support for investment in countermea-
sures.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we presented a framework for quantitative
penetration testing, which is the first such framework as far
as we are aware. The approach features the registration of the
time taken in testing, and the calculation of the difficulty of
attack steps based on the time and the skill of the tester. The
skill of the tester is also updated based on the performance
in the tests.
The approach can as well be used with real attack data,
but in a more limited sense, since the identity of the attacker
is unknown, and the time for the individual steps may not be
available either. We have provided methods for such settings
as well, and these are somewhat simpler, as they do not
rely on Item Response Theory for taking attacker skill into
account.
The main limitation of the approach lies in the amount
of data required to obtain statistically significant results.
However, as we have discussed, in many practical settings
it may be sufficient to gain reasonable confidence in the
estimates by repeating the test scenarios a few times, and
monitoring the variance in the outcomes. In any case,
the simple addition of time metrics to penetration testing
already improves upon the existing situation in terms of the
information provided for security risk management purposes.
One possible extension would be separating the time
(effort) spent by the attacker, and the real time elapsed
before success. This would for example be relevant in a
phishing attack, in which the effort (time spent) per attempt
is negligible, but the time until success may be much longer.
Another extension involves multiple skill ratings for the
testers, for example separating their hacking, physical ac-
cess, and social engineering skills. The rating to be updated
is then dependent on the attack step category.
In the future, we plan to use this approach for gather-
ing data on the difficulty of attack steps, including social
engineering, to be used in the case studies in our current
project. We expect the case studies to provide insights for
further extensions of the framework.
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